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) 
[L. A. No. 23524. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1955.J 
PIETRO FERRO, Respondent, v. CITIZENS NATIONAL 
TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES, 
Appellant. 
[L. A. No. 23525. In Bank. Apr. 26, 1955.] 
MONARCH WINE COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation), Re· 
spondent v. CITIZENS NA TIONAL TRUST AND 
. SAVINGS BANK OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant. 
[1] Pledges-Trust Character of Relation.-A pledgee of collateral 
security for payment of debt is trustee of pledgor. 
[2] Insurance-Persons Entitled to Proceeds: Trusts-Following 
Trust Property.-Jnsurance proceeds of insured wine, which 
was destroyed by fire while stored with winery, take place of 
wine, and when such proceeds come into possession of loss 
payee holding policy as collateral security for its loans to 
winery, they become subject to trust established by pledge. 
[3] Pledges-Application of Proceeds-Surplus.-After pledgee of 
insurance policy has applied insurance proceeds to discharge 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Pledges, § 31; Am.Jur., Pledge and Collateral 
Security, § 43 et seq. 
Mc.K. Dig. References: [1] Pledges, § 22; [2,8] Insurance, § 220; 
Trusts, § 272; [3J Pledges, § 78; [4] Assumpsit, § 7; [5J Money 
Received, § 24(1); [6, 7] Insurance, § 220; [9] Trusts, § 276(1); 
[10] Trusts, § 283; [11] Money Received, § 28; [12,13] Trusts, 
§330; [141 Trusts, §314; [15] Trial, §228; [16] Damages, §198; 
{17J Tl'1JS\.'S, i S36; [18] Damages, § 43. 
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obligation secured by pledge, it is obliged, on satisfaction 
thereof, to return any surplus to pledgor. (Civ. Code, § 3008.) 
[4] Assumpsit-Effect of Express Contract-Contract Fully Per-
formed.-General rule that common count will not lie to en-
force express contract does not apply if plaintiff owes no 
further performance under contract and nothing remains to 
be done thereunder except payment of money by defendant, 
in which case payment can be recovered under complaint 
stating common count for money had and received. 
[5] Money Received-Pleading.-In action by owner of wine de-
stroyed by fire against loss payee holding policy as collateral 
security for its loans to winery on whose premises wine was 
stored, complaint based on common count for money had 
and received stated cause of action, where defendant exercised 
its rights under pledge to satisfy plaintiff's debts out of in-
surance proceeds, so that nothing remained to be done but 
payment by defendant of surplus to plaintiff. 
[6] Insurance-Persons Entitled to Proceeds.-Provision in fire 
policy that "Loss .•• [shall] be adjusted with and .•. pay-
able to the insured specifically named herein" does not entitle 
insured winery to insurance proceeds in excess of insurable 
interest of loss payee holding policy as collateral security 
for its loans to winery, since such provision merely defines 
obligation of insurer and is intended to protect insurer by 
permitting it to pay named insured and be thereafter free 
of elaims by other persons who might have interest in lost 
property; it does not give pledgee right to transfer such 
proceeds to insured nor prevent insured, owner of wine and 
pledgee from expressly agreeing to different arrangement. 
[7] ld.-Persons Entitled to Proceeds.-In action by owner of 
wine destroyed by fire against loss payee holding policy as 
eollateral security for its loans to winery on whose premises 
wine was stored, defendant's contention that it was merely 
acting as collection agent for insured winery is rebutted by 
testimony that defendant "insisted" that it be last to endorse 
claim drafts issued by insurer and that it control disposition 
of all insurance proceeds, and by testimony of winery's presi-
dent that defendant was not acting as mere agent of winery 
but that winery was obliged to "follow the procedure set down 
by [defendant]" for handling and disposition of funds. 
[8] Id.-Persons Entitled to Proceeds: Trusts-Following Trust 
Property.-Insurance proceeds take place of insured chattel 
and named insured holds proceeds in trust for owner of chattel, 
and if such proceeds come into possession of third person who 
has notice of trust and of interest of beneficial owner, he 
likewise holds them in trust. 
[4} See Oal.Jur.2d, Assumpsit, § 10; Am.Jur., Assumpait, § 7. 
Apr. 1955] FERRO V. CITIZENS NAT. TRUST & SAY. BANK 403 
[44 C.2d 401; 282 P.2d 849) 
[9] Trusts-Following Trust Property-Knowledge or Notice of 
Transferee.-Loss payee having possession of insurance pro-
ceeds of insured wine with actual knowledge of wine owner's 
interest commits breaches of trust by allowing such proceeds 
to be used to pay insured winery's unsecured creditors, by 
commingling such proceeds with those of building and equip-
ment insurance, by paying itself winery president's personal 
debt and winery's unsecured debt, and by delivering remainder 
of proceeds to winery without paying wine owner and without 
notice to such owner that it was thus disposing of proceeds, 
and fact that winery was also obligated to pay wine owner 
and that such owner might have recovered its share of pro-
ceeds from winery before its bankruptcy cannot excuse loss 
payee's breach of its trust obligation to wine owner. 
[10] ld. - Following Trust Property - Knowledge or Notice of 
Transferee.-In action by owner of wine to recover proceeds 
of fire policy from loss payee holding policy as collateral 
security for its loans to winery on whose premises wine was 
stored, jury could reasonably conclude that loss payee should 
have known that possibility of payment of wine owner's 
. claim was both doubtful and hazardous where, for several 
years before fire, loss payee had continuous course of dealings 
with winery and kept informed of winery's financial condi-
tion, where at time of fire loss payee held approximately 
$4,000 worth of trade acceptances on which winery had de-
faulted and which were paid from insurance proceeds, and 
where, though it led winery to believe it would not call 
winery's mortgage obligation of $81,000, it did call such 
obligation and paid it off from such proceeds. 
[11] Money Received-Ina.tructions.-In action by owner of wine 
destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in de-
fendant's possession as 10RS payee, jury were not inadequately 
instructed as to what could bp found to be "wrongful" pay-
ment by defendant to winery of insurance proceeds covering 
owner's wine where, considering instructions as whole, jury 
eould not have been under misapprehension as to judge's 
meaning in use of word "wrongful." 
[12] Trusts-Establishment of Trust-Instructions.-In action by 
owner of wine destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of fire 
policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, an instruction 
that defendant became involuntary trustee and held property 
for plaintiff's benefit if defendant wrongfully acquired or 
wrongfully detained plaintiff's property is not necessarily in-
consistent with instructions informing jury of consequences 
of lawful acquisition but wrongful disposition of plaintiff's 
property. 
[IS] Id. - Establishment of Trust - Instructions. - In action by 
e'MJW.l' Gf wine d.estroyed by fire to :recoWl' P"l009aa fIJi. _ 
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policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, instructions 
that plaintiff could not recover if he "authorized or con-
sented" or "consented and agreed" to payment by defendant 
to insured winery are not in conflict with earlier instruction 
using words "assented to or acquiesced in" if word "acquies-
cence" in such instruction referred to laches. 
[14] Id.-Establishment of Trust-Defenses.-Mere acquiescence 
is not defense to action against trustee for breach of trust. 
[16] Trial - Special Verdicts. - Direction of special verdicts is 
within discretion of trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 625.) 
[16] Damages-IJ:.structions.-In actions by owners of wine de-
stroyed oy fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in defendant's 
possession as loss payee, it is proper to instruct jury that if 
verdict is returned for one or more plaintiffs jury must 
determine amount of money particular plaintiff is entitled to 
whete amount due to one plaintiff could be ascertained by 
multiplying gallons destroyed by amount such wine was worth 
and then suhtracting amount of plaintiff's debt to defendant, 
and where amount of other plaintiff's loss was amount which 
he paid for destroyed wine, which was less than amount of 
insurance proceeds attributable to that wine. 
[17] Tru .. ts-Establishment of Trust-Relief Granted.-In actions 
by owners of wine destroyed by fire to recover proceeds of 
fire policy in defendant's possession as loss payee, it is not 
proper to exclude from computation of amount of recovery 
a draft that was used to pay insured winery's attaching 
creditors and draft on which a warehouse company was named 
as payee where these drafts were within defendant's posses-
sion and control, where one draft was paid without notice 
to either plaintiff and one plaintiff's agreement to use the 
other draft to pay winery's creditors was made in reliance 
on defendant's assurance that he would be paid from re-
maining proceeds, and where defendant had knowledge of 
each plaintiff's interest in insurance proceeds and assured each 
that those proceeds would be adequate to pay their claims. 
[18] Damages-Interest.-In actions by owners of wine destroyed 
by fire to recover proceeds of fire policy in defendant's pos-
session as loss payee, plaintiffs are entitled to recover interest 
on portion of insurance proceeds to which they are entitled 
from date of wrongful disbursement thereof, where such 
damages are capable of being made certain on such date except 
for dispute as to amount of shrinkage on one plaintiff's wine, 
which is not included in amount of recovery. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angel~s County. Arthur Coats, Judge.- Affirmed. 
• ~ed bl Chainnaa of Judicial Council. 
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Actions to recover proceeds of insurance policy in de-
fendant's possession as loss payee. Judgments for plaintiffs 
affirmed. 
Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, Leonard A. Diether 
and Edward A. Nugent for Appellant. 
Jerome Weber and Jack Altman for Respondent III No. 
23524. 
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and George K. Hartwick 
for Respondent in No. 23525. 
TRA YNOR J .-Defendant appeals from judgments in 
favor of plaintiffs Ferro and Monarch in actions that were 
separately filed but were consolidated for purposes of trial 
and appeal. In these actions plaintiffs seek to recover insur-
ance proceeds paid for their wine, which was destroyed by 
fire while stored with Sunnyside Winery. These proceeds 
came into defendant's possession, and plaintiffs contend that 
defendant held them in trust for the benefit of plaintiffs and 
that defendant breached that trust by its disposition of 
these proceeds and by its failure to pay them to plaintiffs. 
The storage facilities of Sunnyside Winery were operated 
as a field warehouse by the Lawrence Warehouse Company. 
Of the 297,117 gallons of wine stored therein on February 
8, 1950, the Lawrence Warehouse Company's inventory 
showed that Ferro owned 200,237 gallons, Monarch owned 
83,000 gallons, Federal Wine and Liquor Company owned 
6,100 gallons, Cella Vineyards owned 200 gallons, and Sunny-
side owned 7,580 gallons. All of this wine and a part of 
Sunnyside's winery were destroyed by fire on February 8, 
1950. Pursuant to contracts with the owners of the wine, 
Sunnyside paid the premiums on several policies of insurance 
covering all of the wine in storage. It also maintained 
insurance on its buildings and equipment. Defendant was 
named loss payee in all of these insurance policies. Sunny-
side and its president, Felix Butte, had been clients of 
defendant since 1947 and defendant had occasionally made 
loans to Sunnyside on its wine. Defendant held the policies 
as collateral security for its loans and retained possession 
of them even when there were no loans outstanding in order 
to facilitate the making of a new loan to Sunnyside when 
the occasion for it arose. 
) 
) 
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At the time of the fire Sunnyside owed defendant $81,000 
on a note secured by $25,000 in bonds and a deed of trust and 
a chattel mortgage on its plant and equipment. The insur-
ance policies insured the plant and equipment for a maximum 
of $800,000. Defendant also held approximately $4,000 worth 
of trade acceptances on which Sunnyside was in default. 
On the same date Felix Butte, president of Sunnyside, owed 
defendant $23,000 on an unsecured personal note; Ferro 
owed defendant $52,636.67. which was secured by warehouse 
receipts for the 200,237 gallons of wine stored by Ferro at 
Sunnyside; and Monarch owed defendant $42,000 on two 
unsecured trade acceptances representing the purchase price 
of the wine stored at Sunnyside, which Monarch had pur-
chased through an escrow conducted by defendant. 
After the fire the insurance loss for all of the wine was 
adjusted at $136,440.49 and for the buildings and equipment 
at $202,000. Defendant insisted that Sunnyside, the named 
insured, endorse the insurance claim drafts, that defendant 
be the last to endorse the drafts, and that defendant collect 
them and control all of the proceeds received therefrom. 
Before any of the drafts were collected, however, unsecured 
creditors of Sunnyside, with claims totalling approximately 
$35,000, attached the monies in the hands of the insurers. 
On April 20, 1950, Butte arrived at defendant's place of 
business with the first claim draft from one of the seven 
wine insurers in the amount of $40,932.15. At this time a 
conference took place between Butte, defendant, and Ferro's 
attorney; Monarch was not represented. To obtain a release 
of the attachments, an agreement was reached whereby de-
fendant would endorse the $40,932.15 draft, which would then 
be forwarded for payment of Sunnyside's unsecured creditors 
to the sheriff of San Francisco, who was named a payee 
because of the attachment. Ferro signed a written authoriza-
tion for that disposition of this draft in reliance on the 
further agreement that defendant would collect all of the 
remaining proceeds of the wine insurance and the building 
and equipment insurance and allocate it among the several 
owners of the property that was destroyed by the fire and 
in reliance on the assurance of defendant and an insurance 
adjuster, who was present at the meeting, that the remaining 
proceeds were more than ample to cover all of the claims. 
Defendant endorsed the $-10,932.15 draft, and it was for-
warded to the sheriff of San l"rancisco. Sunnyside's unse-
cured creditors were paid, the atti1chments were released, and 
.... 
) 
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the balance remaining (approximately $6,000) was paid to 
Sunnyside. At the time of its endorsement, defendant knew 
that the claim draft represented proceeds of the wine insur-
ance, and that the proceeds would be used to pay unsecured 
credit.ors of Sunnyside. It was also aware that Sunnyside 
owned only 7,580 gallons of the wine and that the remaindp.r 
was owned by Ferro, Monarch, Federal Wine and LiqutJr 
Company, and Cella Vineyards, in the proportions indicated 
in the Lawrence Warehouse Company's inventory, a copy of 
which was given defendant at the April 20th meeting. 
After the attachments were released, defendant collected 
all but one of the remaining claim drafts on both the wine 
and the building and equipment insurance. Its collections 
from the insurers of the wine totalled $85,275.30, and collec-
tions from the building and equipment insurers totalled 
$183,000. The monies thus collected from the different types 
of insurance were not kept separate, but were commingled, 
and reduced to cashier's checks drawn on defendant and pay-
able to defendant. The only claim draft that defendant did 
not collect was one on which the Lawrence Warehouse Com-
pany was a payee. Lawrence refused to endorse, and 
defendant held it until July 27, 1950, when it forwarded the 
draft to Sunnyside. 
By June 27, 1950, defendant's collections were substantially 
complete, and on that date it took $52,636.67 thereof to satisfy 
Ferro's debt to it. Late in June, Ferro's attorney learned 
that defendant had received the insurance money, but when 
he inquired about it, one of defendant '8 officers told him 
that defendant could not give out information about the 
insurance proceeds without the authorization of Butte. On 
JUly 5, 1950, defendant used insurance proceeds to satisfy 
all of the obligations owed to it by Butte and Sunnyside, 
except the $81,000 due from Sunnyside on its building loan. 
Monarch's obligation had come due before the insurance 
proceeds were collected. At defendant's insistence and in 
reliance on defendant's assurance that it would be reimbursed 
out of the insurance proceeds, Monarch paid its obligations 
on the due date. On July 6, 1950, defendant sent cashier's 
checks aggregating $60,000 to Sunnyside. Defendant retained 
another $60,000 in cashier's checks payable to itself as well 
as the $10,223.04 claim draft on which the Lawrence Ware-
house Company was namrd as a payee. Shortly thereafter it 
received the :tiual payment from the insurera in the amount 
) 
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of $45,000. Neither Ferro nor Monarch had any knowledge 
of these transactions prior to July 6, 1950. 
On July 19, 1950, Monarch wired defendant: "We under-
stand that the insurance moneys were collected on fire loss 
at Sunnyside Winery, Fresno. Amount due us on fire loss 
is approximately $35,000. We have been informed money is 
in your possession. Please be informed that we look to you 
for check in payment of amount due to us on fire loss." On 
this date defendant had in its possession commingled insur-
ance proceeds in the amount of $105,000, as well as the 
$10,223.04 claim draft 01.& which Lawrence Warehouse Com-
pany was a payee. On July 21, 1950, defendant used $81,000 
of the proceeds in its possession to satisfy Sunnyside's build-
ing loan, and the remainder of the proceeds was delivered to 
Sunnyside. On July 24, 1950, defendant wrote Monarch: 
"Please be advised that we do not hold any moneys repre-
senting insurance proceeds on loss by fire of wine inventory 
at Sunnyside Winery, Fresno. California. It is respectfully 
suggested that you communicate with the Sunnyside Winery 
and Mr. Felix Butte, Jr., to whom or to whose order such 
proceeds were paid." On July 27, 1950, defendant .sent the 
$10,223.04 draft to Sunnyside. In November 1950 Sunnyside 
was declared insolvent. Neither Ferro nor Monarch was 
paid for their wine that was lost in the fire, and in this 
action they seek to hold defendant responsible for their loss. 
The Ferro Oase 
Ferro pledged (Civ. Code, §§ 2986, 2987) the warehouse 
receipts for his wine as collateral security for the payment 
of his debt to defendant. [1] A pledgee of collateral se-
curity for the payment of a debt is a trustee of the pledgor. 
(Hudgens v. Ohamberlain, 161 Cal. 710, 715 [120 P. 422] ; 
Sparks v. Oaldwell, 157 Cal. 401, 403 [108 P. 276]; Haber 
v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445, 452 [35 P. 1035] ; Wade v. Markwell 
&- 00., 118 Cal.App.2d 410, 426 [258 P.2d 497, 37 A.L.R.2d 
1363] .) [2] After the wine was destroyed, the insurance 
proceeds tool< the place of the wine (Oalifornia Ins. 00. v. 
Union Oompress 00., 133 U.S. 387, 410 [10 S.Ct. 365, 33 L.Ed. 
730] ; American Eagle Fire Ins. 00. v. Gayle, 108 F.2d 116, 
119; Oentury Ins. 00. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 F.2d 726. 
728), and when those proceeds came into defendant's posses-
sion they likewise became subject to the trust established by 
the pledge. (Haber v. Brown, supra, 101 Cal. 445, 452; 
Ponce v. McElvy, 47 Cal. 1!54. Hi9-160; Tracy v. Stock A.ssur-
cmce Bureau, 132 Cal.App. 573, 580 [23 P.2d 41); al Cal. 
) 
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Jur., "Pledges," § 72; see also Cushmg v. Building Assn. 
etc. vI Psychology, 165 Cal. 731, 737-738 l134 P. 3241; Lucas 
v. Associacao Profectora etc. Da Calif., 61 Cal.App.2d 344. 
351-352 [143 P.2d 53].) [8] Defendant could properly ap-
ply those proceeds to discharge the obligation secured by the 
pledge, but upon satisfaction thereof, it was obliged to return 
any surplus that remained to the pledgor, Ferro. (Civ. Code, 
§ 3008; Hudgens v. Chamberlain, supra, 161 Cal. 710. 715; 
Sparks v. Oaldwell, supra, 157 Cal. 401, 403; MacDonald v. 
Pacific Nat. Bank, 66 Cal.App.2d 357, 365 [152 P.2d 360]; 
see also Baird v. Olsheski! 116 CaLApp. 109. 111 [2 P.2d 
493] .) I ts fail ure to do so was a breach of trust. 
Defendant contends, however, that a pledge is an express 
contract, that it was not pleaded in Ferro's complaint, and 
that it would therefore be improper to allow recovery on 
the theory of breaoh of trust. Ferro did plead a common 
count for money had and received, but defendant contends 
that" such a count will not lie to enforce an express contract," 
citing Barrere v. Somps, 113 Cal. 97, 101 [45 P. 177. 572J. 
[4] The genera] rule thus stated by defendant does not 
apply if the plaintiff owes no further performance under 
the contract and nothing remains to be done thereunder except 
the payment of money by the defendant. Payment can then 
be recovered under a complaint stating a common count for 
money had and received. (Willett &- Burr v. Alpert, 181 
·Cal. 652, 659 [185 P. 976] ; Oasfagnino v. Balletta, 82 CaL 
250, 257-258 [23 P. 127] ; Haggerty v. Warner, 115 Cal.App. 
2d 468, 474 [252 P.2d 373] ; Abbott v. Limited Mut. Oomp. 
Ins. 00., 30 CaLApp.2d 157. 165 [85 P.2d 961]; see also 
McOlure v. Alberti, 190 Cal. 348, 351 [212 P. 204].) The 
latter rule was recognized in the Barrere case, for the court 
there expressly pointed out that the plaintiff's contractual 
obligation was still executory. [5] Ferro's obligation under 
the pledge contract was to pay his debt to defendant. When 
the insurance proceeds for Ferro's wine came into defendant's 
possession they became subject to the pledge, and when de-
fendant exercised its rights under the pledge to satisfy 
Ferro's debt out of t.hose proceeds nothing remained to be 
done but the payment by defendant of the surplus to Ferro. 
Ferro's complaint ther('fore properly stated a cause of action 
for the enforcement of this obligation. 
[6] Defendant also contends that because Sunnyside was 
the named insured ill the insurance policies and because the 
policies provided that the "Loss . • • (shall] be adjusted 
) 
) 
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with and . • • payable to the insured specifically named 
herein," Sunnyside, rather than Ferro and Monarch, was 
legally entitled to the insurance proceeds in excess of de-
fendant's insurable interest, which was protected by the 
commodity loss payable endorsement that appeared on each 
policy. The simple answer to this contention is that the 
provision in the insurance policy defines only the obligation 
of the insurer. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 
7 Ca1.2d 718, 725, 726-727 [62 P.2d 735] ; Mutual Life Ins. 
00. v. Henes, 8 Cal.App.2d 306, 310-311 [47 P.2d 513].) The 
provision is intended to protect the insurer by permitting it 
to pay the named insured and to be thereafter free of claims 
by other persons who might have an interest in the lost 
property. The insurance policy did not give defendant a 
right to transfer the proceeds to Sunnyside, and did not 
prevent Sunnyside, Ferro, and defendant from expressly 
agreeing to a different arrangement (ibid.), as defendant's 
satisfaction from the insurance proceeds of Butte's and 
Sunnyside's unsecured debts clearly shows. 
[7] Moreover, defendant's repeated contention that it was 
merely acting as a collection agent for Sunnyside is I'ebutted 
by the testimony of several witnesses that defendant "in-
sisted " that it be the last to endorse the claim draft and 
that it control the disposition of all of the insurance proceeds, 
and by Butte's testimony that defendant was not acting as 
a mere agent of Sunnyside but that, instead, Sunnyside was 
obliged to "follow the procedure set down by [defendant]" 
for the handling and disposition of these funds. 
The Monarch Oase 
The judgment in favor of Monarch must also be affirmed 
on the ground of breach of trust. Shortly after the fire 
but before any of the insurance proceeds were received. 
Leo Star, president of Monarch, had two conferences with 
one of defendant's officers who assured him that there was 
ample insurance to cover all of the stored wine, including 
that of Monarch, and that Monarch therefore "had nothing 
to worry about." On April 20th (the day the first claim 
draft for $40,932.15 came into defendant's possession) de-
fendant was given a copy of the Lawrence Warehouse Com-
pany's inventory showing that Monarch owned 83,000 gallons 
of wine that had been rlestroyed. On the same day, and 
without notice to Monarch, defendant endorsed the $40,932.15 
claim draft, which waR a part of the proceeds of the wine 
insurance, and delivered it to Butte with 1w.owJ.edae that it 
\ 
i 
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would be used to pay Sunnyside's unsecured creditors. There-
after, defendant collected all of the proceeds of both the wine 
and the building and equipment insurance, with the exception 
of the $10,223.04 claim draft on which the Lawrence Ware-
house Company was named as a payee. Defendant commingled 
these proceeds, and reduced them to cashier's checks drawn 
on itself and payable to itself. (Cf. Civ. Code, § 2236.) 
From these commingled proceeds it paid itself Ferro's debt, 
Butte's personal debt, Sunnyside's unsecured debt, and de-
livered $60,000 to Sunnyside. After these transactions were 
completed, Monarch wired defendant that it was advised that 
defendant was in possession of the insurance proceeds and 
that Monarch was looking to defendant for payment of its 
claim. At that time defendant had in its possession $105,000 
of the commingled proceeds, in addition to the uncollected 
claim draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse Company was 
named payee. The day after receiving Monarch's telegram, 
defendant used $81,000 of the commingled proceeds to pay 
off Sunnyside's building loan. The remainder of the pro-
ceeds was ultimately forwarded to Sunnyside. 
[8] It is established that insurance proceeds take the place 
of the insured chattel, and that the named insured holds the 
proceeds in trust for the owner of the chattel. (Oalifornia 
Ins. 00. v. Union Congress Co., 133 U.S. 387, 410 [10 8.Ct. 
365, 33 L.Ed. 730] ; American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Gayle, 
108 F.2d 116, 119; Century Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Banlc, 102 
F.2d 726, 728; Polley v. Daniels, 238 App.Div. 181 [264 
N.Y.S. 194, 197].) If these proceeds come into the pos-
session of a third party who has notice of the trust and 
of the interest of the beneficial owner, he likewise holds them 
in trust. (Ibid. ; Lucas v. Associacao Protectora etc. Da Calif., 
61 Cal.App.2d 344, 351-352 [143 P.2d 53] ; 3 Scott on Trusts 
§§ 324.3, 324.4.) [9] It is clear that before defendant 
disposed of any of the insurance procee-tis in its possession, 
it had actual knowledge that Monarch owned 83,000 gallons 
of the destroyed wine. Thereafter, defendant committed 
several breaches of trust by allowing proceeds of the wine 
insurance to be used to pay Sunnyside's unsecured creditors, 
by commingling the wine insurance proceeds with those of 
the building and equipment insurance and paying itself 
Butte's personal debt and Sunnyside's unsecured debt, and 
by delivering the remainder of the proceeds to Sunnyside 
without paying Monarch and without notice to Monarch that 
it W&& ~ dis,poiiDi of the proceeds. The fact that SnnD¥-
) 
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side was also obligated to pay Monarch and that Monarch 
might have recovered its share of the proceeds from Sunny-
side (before its bankruptcy in November 1950) cannot excuse 
defendant's breach of its trust obligation to Monarch. 
[10] Moreover, there is evidence from which it can be 
inferred that defendant knew at the time it delivered a part 
of the insurance proceeds to Sunnyside that Sunnyside's 
financial condition was such that the possibility of Monarch's 
and Ferro's claims being paid by Sunnyside was both doubtful 
and hazardous. For several years before the fire, defendant 
had a continuous course of dealings with Sunnyside and kept 
informed of the latter's financial condition. At the time of 
the fire defendant held approximately $4,000 worth of trade 
acceptances on which Sunnyside had defaulted. These accept-
ances were paid from insurance proceeds in July 1950. 
Defendallt knew that Sunnyside urgently needed financing, 
and it led Sunnyside to believe that it would not call the 
latter's mortgage obligation of $81,000. Defendant did call 
that obligation and paid it off from the insurance proceeds 
in its possession. At that time defendant had in its posses-
sion Sunnyside's balance sheet, dated June 15, 1950, which 
listed the whole of the insurance proceeds as an asset of the 
corporation. In light of these facts the jury could reason-
ably conclude that defendant should have known that payment 
of Monarch '8 claim was rendered both doubtful and hazardous 
by delivery to Sunnyside of the insurance proceeds remaining 
after defendant had made the disbursements mentioned above. 
Instructions 
A number of defendant's objections to the instructions 
have already been answered by the foregoing discussion. 
[11] In addition, defendant contends that the jury was 
inadequately instructed as to what could be found to be a 
"wrongful" payment by defendant to Sunnyside of the share 
of the insurance proceeds covering Monarch's wine. Consid-
ering the instruction as a whole, and instructions 41· and 
.,' The gist and substance of Monarch's claim that a constructive trust 
has been established is that before the Bank endorsed the first draft of 
$40,000 it had promised and agreed. or by its conduct led and induced 
Monarch to believe. as a reasonably prudent person, that when it reo 
ceived the insurance proceeds. it would pay to Monarch that portion of 
the insurance proceeds that represented payment for Monarch's wine, 
and that when the Bank did receive such proceeds, it distributed them, 
or allowed them to be digtrihllted to others, knowing at the time that the 
financial condition of Sunnyside was such that the disposal of these 
) 
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42- in particular, it does not appear that the jury could have 
been under any misapprehension as to the trial judge's mean-
ing in the use of the word "wrongful tJ 
[12] Defendant also contends that instructions 41 and 42 
are in conflict with instruction 32. t These instructions 
are not necessarily inconsistent, however, for they were in-
tended to describe the different factual situations on which 
defendant's liability could be predicated. Instruction 32 
informed the jury that if defendant wrongfully acquired or 
wrongfully detained plaintiff's property, it became an invol-
untary trustee and beld the property for plaintiff's benefit. 
Instructions 41 and 42 informed the jury of the consequences 
of lawful a.cquisition but wrongful disposition of plaintiff's 
property. There was evidence to warrant the giving of each 
of these instructions. 
[13] The jury was instructed that if Ferro "authorized 
or consented" or "consented and agreed" to the payment by 
defendant to Sunnyside he could not recover. Defendant 
contends that these instructions are in conflict with an earlier 
instruction using the words "assented to or acquiesced in" 
in that any reference to Ferro's "acquiescence" is omitted. 
funds other than to them would probably result in Monarch's being de-
prived of that portion of the proceeds which represented its wine. 
"In this regard you must determine what facts and circumstances 
have been proved, and whether the facts and circumstances found to be 
proved, are themselves of such a nature as to establish a trust, the breach 
of which would entitle Monarch to judgment in the action. 
"The question of liability must be determined by what happened 
. before the Bank disbursed the money. Whatever conversations took 
place or events occurred after the money passed from the hands of the 
Bank is not to be considered by you in determining the question of 
liability of the Bank." 
.,' In order for Monarch to recover it must be established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence: 
"The Bank knew of tIle ownership of Monarch in the wine destroyed: 
"The Bank agreed to pay Monarch, or led or induced Monarch to 
believe that it would pay Monarch, out of insurance proceeds that came 
into its possession, the insured value of Monarch's wine. 
"That the Bank thereafter paid, or allowed to be paid, to others all 
of the insurance proceeds, except the amount of Ferro's indebtedness 
to it, knowing at the time, or having such knowledge that, as a reason· 
ably prudent person it should have known, that by such action Monarch 
would not be paid for its wine, or that such payment would be doubtful 
and hazardous. 
t"You are instructed that a person who wrongfully detains the prop-
erty of another, or a person who gains property by fraud, accident, mis-
take, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act is, 
unless he has some other nnll hetter right thereto. an im'oluntary trustee 
of the property gained, for the benefit of the person who would other· 
wise have had it." 
414 FERRo 11. CITIZENS NAT. TRUST & SAV .. iANX [44 C.2d 
The instructions were not inconsistent, if the word "acquies-
cence" in the earlier instruction referred to laches. [14] If 
"acquiescence" was intended to mean "passive submission 
or acceptance" (see Webster's New Internat. Diet. [2d ed. 
1942], p. 23), defendant was not prejudiced thereby since 
a mere acquiescence is not a defense to an action against 
a trustee for breach of trust. (Rest., Trusts, § 216 (1), com-
ment a; 2 Scott on Trusts 1151. j 
[15] Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error 
for the court to refuse to give its requested instruction that 
the jury must "state in [its] verdict upon which, if any, of 
the respective causes of action you believe any plaintiff is 
entitled to recover judgment against defendant...." 
Both Ferro and Monarch stated alternative theories of re-
covery in three separate counts of their complaints. The 
instruction requested by defendant in effect asked for special 
verdicts on each of the six counts. The direction of special 
verdicts is within the discretion of the trial judge. ( Code 
Civ. Proc., § 625; House Grain Co. v. Finerman & Sons, 116 
Cal.App.2d 485, 498 [253 P.2d 1034]; Lloyd v. Kleefisch, 
48 Cal.App.2d 408, 417 [120 P.2d 97].) Nothing appears 
herein to indicate that the refusal to give defendant's re-
qncsted instruction was an abuse of discretion. 
[16] Defendant contends that the following instruction 
on the measure of damages was erroneous and prejudicial: 
"If you should return a verdict for one or more of the 
plaintiffs against the defendant, you shall determine tht=' 
amount of money the particular plaintiff is entitled to. and 
return a verdict for that amount, together with interest from 
the 6th day of July, 1950. 
"Plaintiff Ferro seeks to recover on the basis of 14 cents 
a gallon for the wine destroyed by the fire.· 
"Plaintiffs r sic] Monarch seeks to recover the amount paid 
pcr gallon by the insurance companies for its wine stored 
in the Sunnyside ,Varehouse." 
*This prayer was uased on the theory, which was presented at the 
trial, that Ferro's wine was worth 39 cents a ~~:dlon and that his debt 
to defendant was the equi\"alent of :,?;"j cents a gallon. Since that debt 
had been paid he contended that he was entitled to the remaining 14 
cents. 1'his method of computation was the result of a practice estab-
lished bC'fore the fire. l!'crro had agreed to sell his wine to Sunnyside 
in accordance with the latter's needs from time to time. As Sunnyside 
withdrew irregular lots and appropriated them to its own use, it would 
send a eheck for the amount withdrawn, computed at 3!) cents a gallon, 
to defendant. Defendant would retain the equivalent of 2fi cents a 
gallon aull apply it to Ferro's 01: 1 ig-:I tion to defendant. The equivalent 
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The instruction was correct. Ferro's prayer for $29,174.32 
was based on the assumption that he owned 208,388 gallons 
of wine. Evidence was introduced to show that normal shrink-
age had reduced Ferro's wine to 200,237 gallons. The jury 
accepted this evidence and multiplied that figure by 39 cents. 
From that total ($78,092.43) it subtracted the amount of 
Ferro's debt to defendant ($52,636.67) and returned a verdict 
for the remainder, $25,455.76. Monarch's loss was found to 
be the amount that Monarch paid for the destroyed wine, 
which was less than the amount of insurance proceeds attrib-
utable to that wine. Thus, the verdicts for both plaintiffs 
were less than those that could have been returned under the 
court's instructions. 
[17] Defendant contends, however, that it "received" 
only $85,275.30 of the total wine insurance proceeds of 
$136,440.49, and thus that plaintiffs are at most entitled to 
a share of that sum equivalent to the proportion that their 
wine bore to the total amount of the destroyed wine and, 
in Ferro's case, less the amount of his debt to defendant. 
Such a computation would result in a verdict for Ferro in 
the amount of $4,830.35, and for Monarch in the amount of 
$23,821.74. This argument is based on the assumption that 
it is proper to exclude from the computation the $40,932.15 
draft that was used to pay Sunnyside's attaching creditors 
and the $10,233.04 draft on which the Lawrence Warehouse 
. Company was named a payee. These drafts cannot be ex-
cluded. Defendant had these drafts as well as the remainder 
of the proceeds within its possession and control. It delivered 
the $10,233.04 draft to Sunnyside without notice to either 
plaintiff, and Ferro's agreement to the use of the $40,932.15 
draft to pay Sunnyside's creditors was made in reliance on de-
fendant's assurance that he would be paid from the remaining 
proceeds. Defendant had knowledge of each plaintiff's in-
terest in the wine insurance proceeds and it assured each of 
them that those proceeds would be adequate to pay their 
claims. Defendant was a trustee of those funds and was 
obligated to protect plaintiffs' interests therein. 
[18] It is contended that the court's instruction that 
plaintiffs were entitled to interest from July 6, 1950, was 
error and that plaintiffs are entitled to interest only from 
the date of jUdgment. Section 3287 of the Civil Code provides 
that "Every person who is entitled to recover damages cer-
tain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and 
the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular 
) 
) 
day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that 
day ..•. " (See Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal.2d 204, 209-213 
[195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380].) Plaintiffs' damages were 
"capable of being made certain" on July 6, 1950, except 
for the dispute over the amount of shrinkage on Ferro's wine. 
There was no question but that Ferro was entitled to recover 
for 200,237 gallons of wine, and the dispute over the amount 
of shrinkage from the original 208,388 gallons cannot affect 
the certainty of that figure. Since the jury limited recovery 
to 200,237 gallons, there was no error in allowing interest. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonda, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J. eoncurred. 
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